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PALSGRAF REVISITED*

William L. Prossert

P

the most celebrated of all tort cases is Palsgraf v. Long
Island Railroad Company.1 Certainly it is one of the most contro-

ERHAPS

versial. Thirteen judges in all passed upon the case, and seven of them
were for the plaintiff, at least in the sense that they considered that the
issue was one to be left to the jury. Four of the remaining six, sitting
on the Court of Appeals of New York, had the :final word, and they set
aside the verdict, dismissed the complaint, and ordered judgment for
the defendant.2 The Advisers of the Restatement of Torts debated the
question long and vigorously and approved the case by a narrowly
divided vote. Subsequent decisions, even when they cite Palsgraf, have
remained in a state of disagreement and confusion, and the problem
presented cannot be said by any means to be settled and disposed of.
The legal writers3 have galloped off in all directions, in a tangle of duty,

" This article is one of the Thomas M. Cooley lectures delivered by Dean Prosser at
the University of Michigan Law School, February 2-6, 1953. The series, "Selected Topics
on the Law of Torts," will eventually be published in book form by the University of
Michigan Law School.-Ed.
t Boalt Professor of Law and Dean of the Law School, University of California,
Berkeley.-Ed.
1248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
2 The alignment was as follows: For the plaintiff: Humphrey, in the trial court; Seeger,
Hagarty and Carswell, in the appellate division; Andrews, Crane and O'Brien, in the court
of appeals. For the defendant: Lazansky and Young, in the appellate division; Cardozo,
Pound, Lehman and Kellogg, in the court of appeals.
3 Almost everyone who writes on negligence has a word to say about Palsgraf. The
following list is by no means exclusive: Green, "The Palsgraf Case,'' 30 CoL. L. REv. 789
(1930), reprinted in GREEN, JUDGE AND JtmY, c. 8 (1930); Goodhart, "The Unforeseeable
Consequences of a Negligent Act," 39 YALE L.J. 449 (1930); Steuer, "The Conception of
Duty in Personal Injury Cases in New York,'' 18 CoRN. L.Q. 51 (1932); HARPER, LAw
oF ToRTS §73 (1933); Buckland, "The Duty to Take Care,'' 51 L.Q. REv. 637 (1935);
Tilley, ''The English Rule as to Liability for Unintended Consequences," 33 MxcH. L.
REv. 829 (1935); Porter, "The Measure of Damages in Contract and Tort," 5 CM.rn. L.J.
176 (1935); Campbell, "Duty, Fault and Legal Cause,'' 1938 Wxs. L. REv. 402; Cowan,
''The Riddle of the Palsgraf Case," 23 MrNN. L. REv. 46 (1938); Gregory, "Proximate
• Cause in Negligence-A Retreat from Rationalization,'' 6 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 36 (1938);
Seavey, "Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts,'' 52 HARv. L. REv. 372 (1939), 48
YALE L. J. 390 (1939), 39 CoL. L. REv. 20 (1939); ELDREDGE, MoDERN ToRT PROBLEMS
15-17 (1941); Ehrenzweig, ''Loss-Shifting and Quasi-Negligence: A New Interpretation
of the Palsgraf Case," 8 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 729 (1941); Goodhart, "Bourhill v. Young,''
8 CAf.rn. L.J. 265 (1944); Scarborough, "'The Unforeseeable Consequences of a Negligent
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negligence, foresight, hindsight, dire_ct and intervening causes, the division and classification of interests and injuries, liability without fault
or in excess of fault, social policy, the balancing of various claims to
protection or immunity, and everything else that inevitably becomes
involved in any discussion of "proximate cause."
It may be worse than useless to add another article to the spate. The
excuse must be the fascination which the case has for both teachers and
students of torts, the never-ending new facets which it offers year after
year in the classroom, and the fact that, if one may judge by what has
appeared in print, the writer is the one man alive who is not absolutely
and altogether sure of the answer. An expression of difficulties, uncertainties and doubts, arriving at no very definite conclusion, may at
least be something of a novelty.
Helen Palsgraf4 "was standing on a platform of defendant's railroad5
after buying a ticket to go to Rockaway Beach. A train stopped at the
station, bound for another place. Two men ran forward to catch it.
One of the men reached the platform of the car without mishap, though
the train was already moving. The other man, carrying a package,
jumped aboard the car, but seemed unsteady as if about to fall. A guard
on the car, who had held the door open, reached forward to help him in,
and another guard on the platform pushed him from behind. In this .
act, the package was dislodged, and fell upon the rails. It was a package
of small size, about fifteen inches long,6 and covered by a newspaper.
In fact it contained £reworks, 7 but there was nothing in its appearance
Act'-Reconsidered," 2 RaTGERS L. REv. 196 (1948); Morison, "A Re-examination of the
Duty of Care," 11 MoD. L. REv. 9 (1948); Greenwell, "Re Polemis and Remoteness of
Damage in Tort," 24 AusT. L.J. 392 (1951); Eldredge, "The Role of Foreseeable Consequences in Negligence Law," 23 PA. B.A.Q. 158 (1952); PROSSER, ToRTS §31 (1941).
4 The Record of the case is set out in ScoTT AND SIMPSON, CAsEs ON CIVIL PROCEDURE (1950) at pages 891-940. It will be referred to hereafter as REcoRD. The plaintiff
was a Brooklyn janitress and housewife, 43 years of age. She was accompanied by her two
daughters, aged 15 and 12. REcoRD, 901.
5 This was at the East New York station. REcoRD, 902.
6 Actually a round or oval bundle, fifteen to twenty inches in diameter. REcoRD, 909.
7 This is a conclusion from the event. It appears to rest chiefly on the testimony of the
plaintiff (REcoRD, 903) that she heard "firecrackers shooting," and of another witness (917)
that there were several explosions. There was a "ball of fire," much noise, and a "mass of
black smoke'' (903, 907, 909, 919, 921, 922). The smoke extended to where the plaintiff
stood, so that she and her daughter were "choked" in it. This lasted for an appreciable
interval, long enough for the plaintiff to say to her daughter, ''Elizabeth, turn your back."
Then "the scale blew and hit me on the side" (903).
One witness testified that the explosion was not much like fireworks; "there wasn't
much fire to it; there was mostly more smoke and noise" (919). The men running for the
train were Italians, and the one with the bundle hit a woman in the stomach in his hurry
(916). Although the train was stopped, and a bystander proposed to an officer to identify
him (909), he apparently did not come forward, and disappeared. Any incurable romantic
who visualizes the Mafia and an infernal machine is perhaps not entirely ruled out.
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to give notice of its contents. The fireworks when they fell exploded.8
The shock of the explosion threw down some scales0 at the other end of
the platform, many feet away. 10 The scales struck the plaintiff, causing
injuries for which she sues."11 The date was not July 4, but August 24,
1924,1 2 and no one in the station except the man with the package and
his companion had any reason whatever to suppose that he was carrying
anything explosive.
The defendant offered no evidence and moved to dismiss the case.13
The trial court denied the motion, and instructed the jury that if the
defendant's guards were careless and negligent in the way they handled
the passenger boarding the train, the plaintiff was entitled to
recover.14 The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of
$6,000.15 Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied, and judgment was entered on the verdict.
On the first appeal16 the judges of the appellate division saw
nothing in the case but "proximate cause." Three of them, in a short
8 The package appears rather to have been set off by the wheels of the train. It fell
between the platform and the train, and ''like stuck there, and as the train kept on moving
why, it caused it to explode" (RllcoRD, 919). About a second elapsed between the fall and
the explosion, during which "about half a car went by'' (911).
9 No witness saw this. There was testimony that afterward the scale was found to be
''blown right to pieces and knocked down, the glass was busted and blown-just simply laid
down on the platform" (RllcoRD, 910). It was evidently an ordinary penny scale of the
railroad platform type, with a mirror, standing as high as Mrs. Palsgraf's head (902). She
testified that there was "Hying glass" (903), and her daughter said that she heard the scale
''blow apart" (922). Notwithstanding all this, it is very probable, in line with the original
theory of the plaintiff's complaint (896), that the scale was in fact knocked over by the
stampede of frightened passengers (903). There was an appreciable interval after the "ball
of fire'' before the "scale blew" (903). With the explosion occurring in the pit between
the platform and the train, or under the wheels (919), it is difficult to see how the scale
would not be completely protected from it. Although the platform was crowded (902),
there is no indication in the RllcoRD that any other damage whatever was done by the
explosion itself.
10 The RllcoRD is annoyingly silent on this distance. The platform was twelve to fifteen feet wide (902, 917), but the plaintiff did not see where the package fell, and could
not state how far away she was (907). No other witness was asked. Judge Andrews, at
248 N.Y. 356, says that it was "apparently twenty-five or thirty feet." There was no plat
in evidence, and Andrews could not have known, unless there was some statement of
counsel.
A motion for reargument was denied in 249 N.Y. 511, 164 N.E. 564 (1928). The
court there said: "If we assume that the plaintiff was nearer the scene of the explosion
than the prevailing opinion would suggest, she was not s~ near that injury from a falling
package, not known to contain explosives, would be within the range of reasonable
prevision."
11 Quoted from the opinion of Cardozo, C.J., in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248
N.Y. 339 at 340-341, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
12 RllcoRD, 901.
13 R:EcoRD, 928.
14 R:EcoRD, 929-930.
15 Rllconn, 931.
16 Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 222 App. Div. 166, 225 N.Y.S. 412 (1927).
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opinion, said that the causal connection was similar to that in the Squib
Case,17 and that the fact the guards did not know that the bundle contained an explosive was no defense. Two others, in even fewer words,
said that the explosion was not a likely or natural result of the conduct
of the guards, and that the negligence of the passenger carrying the
explosive was an "independent intervening cause." The judgment for
the plaintiff was affirmed. No one seemed to consider the case at all
important.
It might never have been important if there had not occurred, at
this point, one of those accidents which shape the course of the law.
The opinion of the appellate division fell into the hands of Professor
Francis H. Bohlen of Pennsylvania, who was at that time the Reporter
of the American Law Institute for the Restatement of the Laiv of Tarts.
Bohlen was even then struggling with the problem of duty in negligence cases, and particularly with duty to the unforeseeable plaintiff.
He was well aware of the confusion in the cases of "proximate cause,"
and he was disposed to accept the position, already advanced by
Bingham18 and Green,19 that in such cases as this the question is
essentially one of duty, and that unless the defendant's conduct involves
some foreseeable risk to the plaintiff, the defendant is under no duty
to him at all, whatever his duty may be toward anyone els~.· He had
prepared, for submission to his advisers, a draft of a section20 which
stated this view. Palsgraf provided a perfect illustration, and Bohlen
added a statement of the facts to his explanatory notes.
Among the advisers who met to consider this draft was Chief Judge
Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals, who found himself
suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with a discussion, by an
eminent and entirely impartial group, of a lower New York decision
which might very possibly be appealed to his court. He concluded that
there would be no impropriety in his presence at the meeting, although
he took no part in the discussion, and did not vote. He sat therefore as
audience, to a long and lively debate, ranging over nearly all of the
11 Scott v. Shepherd, 3 Wils. 403, 95 Eng. Rep. 1124 (1773).
18 Bingham, "Some Suggestions Concerning 'Legal Cause' at Common

Law," 9 CoL.
L. REv. 16, 136 at 154 (1909).
19 Green, "Axe Negligence and 'Proximate Cause' Determinable by the Same Test?"
1 TEx. L. REv. 243 at 423 (1923); GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAusE (1927).
20 Finally adopted as §281 of the Restatement of Torts. The pertinent provisions are
as follows:
"The actor is liable for an invasion of an interest of another, if:
(a) the interest invaded is protected against unintentional invasion, and
(b) the conduct of the actor is negligent with respect to such interest or any other
similar interest of the other which is protected against unintentional invasion. . . ."
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questions which since have surrounded Palsgraf, and going far beyond
the scope of the arguments of counsel in the case, who were still
foundering in the morass of proximate cause. The decision, by a
narrow margin which may have consisted of a single vote, upheld the
Reporter and approved his section.21
Cardozo was convinced by the majority. When the appeal came
on his return to Albany, he adopted their view, with the concurrence
of three other judges of the court of appeals, as the law of the case.
There was no liability, he said, because there was no negligence toward
the plaintiff. Negligence must be a matter of some relation between
the parties, some duty, which could be founded only on the foreseeability of some harm to the plaintiff in fact injured. "Negligence in
the air, so to speak, will not do." The defendant's conduct did not
become a "vrong to Mrs. Palsgraf merely because it threatened injury
to someone else. She must sue "in her own right for a wrong personal
to her, and not as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty to
another." Assuming, without deciding, that negligence toward the
plaintiff would entail liability for any and all consequences, however
novel or extraordinary, there was no such negligence here. The conduct of the guards toward the passenger involved no foreseeable risk
that the plaintiff might be injured; it was therefore no tort as to her, and
as a matter of law she could not recover. Cardozo added: "There is
room for argument that a distinction is to be drawn according to the
diversity of interests invaded by the act, as where conduct negligent
in that it threatens an insignificant invasion of an interest in property
results in an unforeseeable invasion of an interest of another order, as
e.g., one of bodily security. Perhaps other distinctions may be necessary. We do not go into the questions now." 22
21 The writer is indebted for this account of the meeting to Dean Young B. Smith of
the Columbia Law School, who was present as one of the advisers.
22 248 N.Y. 339 at 347, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). "The conduct of the defendant's guard,
if a wrong in its relation to the holder of the package, was not a wrong in its relation to
the plaintiff, standing far away. Relatively to her it was not negligence at all. Nothing in
the situation gave notice that the falling package had in it the potency of peril to persons
thus removed. Negligence is not actionable unless it involves the invasion of a legally
protected interest, the violation of a right. 'Proof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will
not do.' (Pollock, Torts [11th ed.], p. 455 •••) •..• "If no hazard was apparent to the eye
of ordinary vigilance, an act innocent and harmless, at least to outward seeming, with
reference to her, did not take to itself the quality of a tort because it happened to be a
wrong, though apparently not one involving the risk of bodily insecurity, with reference to
some one else. 'In every instance, before negligence can be predicated of a given act, back
of the act must be sought and found a duty to the individual complaining, the observance
of which would have averted or avoided the injury.' ..•
''The argument for the plaintiff is built upon the shifting meanings of such words as
'wrong' and 'wrongful,' and shares their instability. What the plaintiff must show is 'a
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Judge Andrews, dissenting, met the issue head on. Negligence, he
said, does not depend upon a relation between the defendant and the
plaintiff; it is a wrong toward anyone in fact injured by the negligent
act. There is a duty toward the world at large not to be negligent
toward any person; and when an injury to the plaintiff results from a
breach of this duty, she may have a cause of action. There are limitations upon this liability, but they are limitations of "proximate cause,"
and the remoteness of the damage. On this what the prudent inight
foresee may have a bearing, but it is only "some bearing, for the
problem of proximate cause is -not to be solved by any one consideration." It is not a question of logic, but of practical politics; and the
courts do the best they can to draw an uncertain and wavering line,
which will be practical and in keeping with the general understanding
of mankind. The injury here was direct and immediate; the distance
was short; there was no remoteness in time, little in space. It cannot
be said as a matter of law that the plaintiff's injuries were not the
proximate result of the negligence. 23
wrong' to herself, i.e., a violation of her own, right, and not merely a wrong to some one
else, nor conduct 'wrongful' because unsocial, but not 'a wrong' to any one. • • •
"Negligence, like risk, is thus a term of relation. Negligence in the abstract, apart from
things related, is surely not a tort, if indeed it is understandable at all .••• Negligence is
not a tort unless it results in the commission of a wrong, and the commission of a wrong
imports the violation of a right, in this case, we are told, the right to be protected against
interference with one's bodily security. But bodily security is protected, not against all
forms of interference or aggression, but only against some. One who seeks redress at law
does not make out a cause of action by showing without more that there has been damage
to his person. If the harm was not willful, he must show that the act as to him had
possibilities of danger so many and apparent as to entitle him to be protected against the
doing of it though the harm was unintended. . • ."
". . . We may assume, without deciding, that negligence, not at large or in the
abstract, but in relation to the plaintiff, would entail liability for any and all consequences,
however novel or extraordinary.•••" Cardozo, C.J., id. at 341-347.
23 " ••• The result we shall reach depends upon our theory as to the nature of negligence. Is it a relative concept-the breach of some duty owing to a particular person or to
particular persons? Or where there is an act which unreasonably threatens the safety of
others, is the doer liable for all its proximate consequences, even where they result in injury
to one who would generally be thought to be outside the radius of danger? • • •
"... In an empty world negligence would not exist. It does involve a relationship
between man and his fellows. But not merely a relationship between man and those whom
he might reasonably expect his act would injure. Rather, a relationship between him and
those whom he does in fact injure. If his act has a tendency to harm some one, it harms
him a mile away as surely as it does those on the scene. • • •
"The proposition is this. Every one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining
from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others. Such an act occurs.
Not only is he wronged to whom harm might reasonably be expected to result, but he also
who is in fact injured, even if he be outside what would generally be thought the danger
zone. There needs be duty due the one complaining but this is not a duty to a particular
individual because as to him harm might be expected. Harm to some one being the natural
result of the act, not only that one alone, but all those in fact injured may complain.•••
Unreasonable risk being taken, its consequences are not confined to those who might
probably be hurt •••
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So ended the Palsgraf case. Before leaving the opm1ons, the
comment may be ventured that, with due respect to the superlative style
in which both are written, neither of them wears well on long acquaintance. Both of them beg the question shamelessly, stating dogmatic
propositions without reason or explanation. If there is or is not a duty
to the plaintiff not to injure her in this way, nothing else remains to
be said. Both of them assume that there was no relation whatever
between the defendant and the plaintiff on which a duty might be
founded; both utterly ignore the fact, on which the appellate division
laid stress,24 that Mrs. Palsgraf was a passenger. From the moment
that she bought her ticket the defendant did in fact owe her a duty of
the highest care, one of the most stringent known to the law. The
question was not one of injury to some stranger across the street, but of
whether the duty to a passenger extended to the consequences of
negligence threatening another passenger-which may very well be a
different thing altogether.
There is, furthermore, the question left unanswered by Cardozo:
what would have been the result if the explosion had injured the owner
of the package, or had damaged his suitcase on a baggage truck? There
is also the troublesome matter of the scale, It is difficult to escape the
conclusion that anything on a railroad platform so easily knocked over,
whether by a paltry explosion of fireworks which damaged nothing
else, or by a jostling and panicky crowd, had no business being there;
and if there was negligence in having the scale, it was certainly
negligence toward the plaintiff herself, who was standing beside it.25
"•.• But there is one limitation. The damages must be so connected with the negligence that the latter may be said to be the proximate cause of the former. • • • What we
do mean by the word 'proximate' is, that because of convenience, of public policy, of a
rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain
point. This is not logic. It is practical politics.••. And here not what the [defendant]
had reason to believe would be the result of his conduct, but what the prudent would foresee, may have a bearing. May have some bearing, for the problem of proximate cause is
not to be solved by any one consideration." Andrews, J., dissenting in Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 at 347-354, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
24 "It must be remembered that the plaintiff was a passenger of the defendant and
entitled to have the defendant exercise the highest degree of care required of common
carriers." Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 222 App. Div. 166 at 168, 225 N.Y.S. 412
(1927).
25 On this basis the question becomes one of negligence toward the foreseeable plaintiff, with the foreseeable result brought about by quite unforeseeable means. Here the
decisions are all for the plaintiff. Johnson v. Kosmos Portland Cement Co., (6th Cir. 1933)
64 F. (2d) 193; Carroll v. Central Counties Gas Co., 74 Cal. App. 303, 240 P. 53 (1925);
Washington & G. R. Co. v. Hickey, 166 U.S. 521, 17 S.Ct. 661 (1897); McDowell v.
Village of Preston, 104 Minn. 263, 116 N.W. 470 (1908); Munsey v. Webb, 231 U.S.
150, 34 S.Ct. 44 (1913); Dalton v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 241 Mass. 400, 135 N.E. 318
(1922); Moore v. Townsend, 76 Minn. 64, 78 N.W. 880 (1899); Derosier v. New
England Tel. & Tel. Co., 81 N.H. 451, 130 A. 145 (1925); Salisbury v. Herchenroder,
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There is no mention of this at all, undoubtedly because the idea never
occurred to counsel; but it occurs every year to some one of my law
school freshmen, who then concludes that he is brighter than the New
York Court of Appeals.
All this aside, the case must be taken as it stands. The aftermath
was that Cardozo's opinion immediately became grist to the mill of
Professor Bohlen, who dwelt upon it in presenting the Tentative
Draft:2 6 of the Restatement to the annual meeting of the American Law
Institute. The meeting, without discussion or even mention of the
problem, accepted the language of the draft and threw the weight of
the Restatement behind the decision. 27 It is not likely that any other
case in all history ever elevated itself by its own bootstraps in so remarkable a manner.
The Restatement notwithstanding, it cannot fairly be said that
subsequent history has determined the issue. It has become fashionable
to cite Palsgraf in every kind of negligence case, and most of the long
array of references to it in the Citator must be disregarded as insignificant and immaterial.28 Some courts have purported to follow the
case, or to rely upon it, in situations which appear to be quite clearly
distinguishable. Thus Ohio, Maryland, and Maine29 have applied it to
106 Mass. 458, 8 Am. Rep. 354 (1871); Teasdale v. Beacon Oil Co., 266 Mass. 25, 164
N.E. 612 (1929); Van Cleef v. Chicago, 240 ill. 318, 88 N.E. 815 (1909); Riley v.
Standard Oil Co., 214 Wis. 15, 252 N.W. 183 (1934); Gibson v. Garcia, 96 Cal. App.
(2d) 681, 216 P. (2d) 119 (1950).
26ToRTS RESTATEMENT, Tentative Draft No. 4 (1929), §165.
PROCEEDINGS OF AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (1929), p. 171 (section 165: "no
remarks").
There is a persistent legend that this meeting debated the Palsgraf case long and
violently, and that the Reporter was finally upheld by the margin of a single vote. I have
talked with gentlemen who were present, and who believed that they had a distinct recollection to this effect. It would have been most appropriate, since everything else connected
with the case was decided by one vote. But if the Proceedings speak truth, which scarcely
can be doubted, the still more remarkable fact is that the meeting of the American Law
Institute did not consider the Palsgraf question to be worth any "remarks" at all.
28 Apart from mere incidental mention, the following are typical of these more or less
casual references to the case: Hatch v. Globe Laundry Co., 132 Me. 379, 171 A. 387
(1934) (cited for the proposition that the precise form of injury need not necessarily be
foreseen, where a rescuer was found to be a foreseeable plaintiff); Morrison v. Medagl.ia,
287 Mass. 46, 191 N.E. 133 (1934) (cited on the point that the conduct to be anticipated
from a third person has a bearing on the defendant's duty, where some injury to the plaintiff was found to be clearly foreseeable); Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26 Cal. (2d) 213,
157 P. (2d) 372 (1945) (cited in concurring opinion of Traynor, J., on the point that
"proximate cause" is properly a question of duty, where all of the court agreed that harm
to the plaintiff was foreseeable); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Vaughn, 292 Ky. 120,
166 S.W. (2d) 43 (1942) (cited on the duty point in a case of attractive nuisance).
29 Hetrick v. Marion-Reserve Power Co., 141 Ohio St. 347, 48 N.E. (2d) 103 (1943);
Birckhead v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 174 Md. 32, 197 A. 615 (1938); Andreu
v. Welhnan, 144 Me. 36, 63 A. (2d) 926 (1949).
217
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cases where no injury to anyone was to be anticipated, and there was
simply no negligence at all. New Hampshire, Wyoming, and Utah30
have relied on Palsgraf in support of the familiar rule that a statute
intended to protect only a particular class of persons, or to guard only
against a particular risk or type of harm, creates no duty as to any other
class or risk. The written law and the policy of strict construction
which refuses to extend its effect beyond the legislative purpose seem
definitely to set this apart from any court-made rule. Missouri31 has
mentioned the case in holding that the duty of train men toward
passengers and drivers at crossings does not extend to an employee at
work beside the track; but here, as in the case of trespassers,32 and as
the decision recognized, there is an element of assumption of risk or
responsibility on the part of the plaintiff, which limits any duty to him.
Pennsylvania33 has done the same in holding that a landlord's liability
for breach of his covenant to repair does not extend to an employee of
the tenant. Whether this be right or wrong-and the Restatement
itself does not agree34-it is at most a refusal to extend a contract
obligation, voluntarily assumed for a consideration, and traditionally
limited to the responsibilities contemplated by the parties at the time. 35
Wisconsin, New Mexico, Georgia, New Hampshire, and Maryland36 all have followed Palsgraf in holding that a plaintiff who is
30 Flynn v. Gordon, 86 N.H. 198, 165 A. 715 (1933); Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v.
Murray, 40 Wyo. 324, 277 P. 703 (1929); Coray v. Southern Pacific Co., 112 Utah 166,
185 P. (2d) 963 (1947). Compare, on the other ground, Kelly v. Henry Muhs Co., 71
N.J.L. 358, 59 A. 23 (1904); Everett v. Great Northern R. Co., 100 Minn. 309, 111 N.W.
281 (1907); Flanagan v. Sanders, 138 Mich. 253, 101 N.W. 581 (1904); Akers v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. R. Co., 58 Minn. 540, 60 N.W. 669 (1894); Ingalsbe v. St. LouisSan Francisco R. Co., 295 Mo. 177, 243 S.W. 323 (1922).
81 Karr v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 341 Mo. 536, 108 S.W. (2d) 44 (1937). Compare, on assumption of risk, Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Nixon, 271 U.S. 218, 46 S.Ct.
495 (1926); Carfelo v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., (2d Cir. 1931) 54 F. (2d) 475.
32Compare Garland v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 76 N.H. 556, 86 A. 141 (1913);
Wickenburg v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co., 94 Minn. 276, 102 N.W. 713
(1905); Peterson v. South & W. R. Co., 143 N.C. 260, 55 S.E. 618 (1906).
33 Harris v. Lewistown Trust Co., 326 Pa. 145, 191 A. 34 (1937). Compare Cullings
v. Goetz, 256 N.Y. 287, 176 N.E. 397 (1931); Chelefou v. Springfield Institute for
Savings, 297 Mass. 236, 8 N.E. (2d) 769 (1937); Timmons v. Williams Wood Products
Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 162 S.E. 329 (1932).
34 ToRTS RESTATEMENT, §§357, 378. Accord: Barron v. Liedloff, 95 Minn. 474, 104
N.W. 289 (1905); Flood v. Pabst Brewing Co., 158 Wis. 626, 149 N.W. 489 (1914);
Merchants' Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. Miller, 135 Tenn. 187, 186 S.W. 87 (1916).
35 See McCoRMICK, DAMAGES, c. 22 (1935).
36 Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935); Curry v. Journal
Pub. Co., 41 N.M. 318, 68 P. (2d) 168 (1937); Blanchard v. Reliable Transfer Co., 71
Ga. App. 843, 32 S.E. (2d) 420 (1944); Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H. 174, 71 A. (2d) 792
(1950); Resavage v. Davies, (Md. 1952) 86 A. (2d) 879. Palsgraf is distinguished in
Frazee v. Western Dairy Products Co., 182 Wash. 578, 47 P. (2d) 1037 (1935), on the
ground that the plaintiff was in the danger zone. It is cited in the dissent in Rasmussen
v. Benson, 135 Neb. 232, 280 N.W. 890 (1937).
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himself in a position of safety cannot recover for mental shock and
injury brought about by the sight of harm or peril to another person, or
to property, within the danger zone. Again, whether this be right or
wrong,37 the £eld is one which the courts have long been reluctant to
enter even where the mental injury is readily foreseeable; and the
frequent mention of the difficulties of proof, the facility of fraud, and
the problem of finding a place to stop and draw the line, suggests that
here it is the nature of the interest invaded, the type of damage, which
is the real obstacle. In the Second Circuit, Learned Hand has accepted
Palsgraf fully in a decision holding that a defendant who negligently
sinks a barge is not liable to underwriters who have insured it. 38 One
may question whether it is really so unforeseeable that any barge may
have insurance, but if it is, the plaintiff's interest is one of contract, and
there is ample authority, long before Palsgraf, that a contract interest is
not entitled to protection against mere negligence.39
It is difficult to conclude that such cases represent any established
principle. For each of them, there are others to be found which come
to the same conclusion on similar facts, but on other and better
grounds. They suggest rather that duty in negligence cases is a very
involved and complex problem, in which many factors interplay, and
that the opinion of Cardozo perhaps greatly over-simplified the whole
matter.
_
When we come to the cases which cannot be so distinguished, they
are few and divided. Pennsylvania40 has accepted Palsgraf fully in a
case where an automobile struck a pedestrian and hurled his body
Compare, on other grounds, Mahoney v. Dankwart, 108 Iowa 321, 79 N.W. 134
(1899); Nuckles v. Tennessee Electric Power Co., 155 Tenn. 611, 299 S.W. 775 (1927);
Ellsworth v. Massacar, 215 Mich. 511, 184 N.W. 408 (1921); Cleveland, C.C. & St. L.
R. Co. v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 56 N.E. 917 (1900).
87 Contra: Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 S. 927 (1912); Gulf, C. &
S.F.R. Co. v. Coopwood, (Tex. Civ. App. 1906) 96 S.W. 102; cf. Cohn v. Ansonia Realty
Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N.Y.S. 39 (1914).
88 Sinram v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (2d Cir. 1932) 61 F. (2d) 767.
89 Anthony v. Slaid, 11 Mete. (Mass.) 290 (1846); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. New York & N.H. R. Co., 25 Conn. 265, 65 Am. Dec. 571 (1856); Peoria Marine &
Fire Ins. Co. v. Frost, 37 Ill. 333 (1865); Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S.
303, 48 S.Ct. 134 (1927); Thompson v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 165 N.C. 377, 81 S.E.
315 (1914); La Societe Anonyme de Remorquage aHelice v. Bennetts, [1911] 1 K.B. 243;
. Brink v. Wabash R. Co., 160 Mo. 87, 60 S.W. 1058 (1900); Dale v. Grant, 34 N.J.L. 142
(1870); Byrd v. English, 117 Ga. 191, 43 S.E. 419 (1903); Pure Oil Co. v. Boyle, (Tex.
Civ. App. 1930) 26 S.W. (2d) 161; cf. Economy Auto Ins. Co. v. Brown, 334 Ill. App.
579, 79 N.E. (2d) 854 (1948). The insurance interest is not protected even when the
defendant intentionally murders the insured, or burns down the insured property. Mobile
Life Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754, 24 L.Ed. 580 (1877); Rockingham Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
v. Bosher, 39 Me. 253, 63 Am. Dec. 618 (1855).
40 Dahlstrom v. Shrum, 368 Pa. 423, 84 A. (2d) 289 (1951).
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against the plaintiff, who was behind a bus and in a position of safety.
This type of case is an old one on which Pennsylvania has stood alone
against a number of other jurisdictions.41 Rhode Island42 has approved
Palsgraf in a dictum where a negligently hung fire extinguisher, upset
by a third person, gave forth a hissing noise and caused a stampede, in
which the plaintiff was injured. On the other hand, Tennessee43 has
rejected the rule flatly in a case where a rubber mat overlapping the top
step of a stairway in a department store caused injury to a customer who
was around a corner at the bottom; and Arkansas44 has rejected it, at
least in dictum, where smoke from a £re on a railroad right of way
aggravated the plaintiff's tuberculosis. These last two cases rebelled
chiefly against the idea that the issue was to be taken from the jury.
Before Palsgraf there were other cases which on their facts clearly
presented the problem of the unforeseeable plaintiff. Where the court
expressly considered the duty theory it was sometimes held that there
was a duty to one to whom no harm could be foreseen45 and sometimes
that there was none. 46 More often the court went off on "proximate
cause," and the greater number of the decisions found that the causal
connection was sufficiently close or direct and allowed the plaintiff to
recover. 47 It would be easy to dismiss these last opinions on the ground
41 Wood v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 177 Pa. 306, 35 A. 699 (1896), went off on proximate cause. Contra, also on proximate cause, are Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Chapman, 80 Ala. 615, 2 S. 738 (1886); Solomon v. Branfman, 175 N.Y.S. 835 (App. Tenn
1919); Wolfe v. Checker Taxi Co., 299 Mass. 225, 12 N.E. (2d) 849 (1938); Robinson
v. Standard Oil Co., 89 Ind. App. 167, 166 N.E. 160 (1929); Kommerstad v. Great
Northern R. Co., 120 Minn. 376, 139 N.W. 713 (1913) and 128 Minn. 505, 151 N.W.
177 (1915). Cf. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hammill, 56 N.J.L. 370, 29 A. 151 (1894).
42 Kane v. Burrillville Racing Assn., 73 R.I. 264, 54 A. (2d) 401 (1947). Since the
text was written, Arizona has relied on Palsgraf in another intervening cause case, in which
a motorist's statutory negligence in failing to have his automobile standing still at the curb
when a highway patrolman passed sounding his siren led to a collision with a convoyed
automobile travelling at high speed into an intersection in the nighttime on the wrong side
of the road. West v. Cruz, 75 Ariz. 13, 251 P. (2d) 311 (1952).
43 Jackson v. B. Lowenstein & Bros., 175 Tenn. 535, 136 S.W. (2d) 495 (1940).
44 Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Johnson, 198 Ark. 1134, 133 S.W. (2d) 33 (1939). See
also Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, 262 Wis. 229, 55 N.W. (2d) 29 (1952),
refusing to apply the Palsgraf principle where defendant was negligent in policing its
theater and a patron was hit in the eye with a spitball.
45 Stevens v. Dudley, 56 Vt. 158 (1883); Wilson v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 30 N.D.
456, 153 N.W. 429 (1915); Hollidge v. Duncan, 199 Mass. 121, 85 N.E. 186 (1908);
Mize v. Rocky Mountain Bell Tel. Co., 38 Mont. 521, 100 P. 971 (1909); and see Poffenbarger, J., in Bond v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 82 W.Va. 557, 96 S.E. 932 (1918).
46 Goodlander Mill Co. v. Standard Oil Co., (7th Cir. 1894) 63 F. 400; Boyd v.
Duluth, 126 Minn. 33, 147 N.W. 710 (1914); Trinity & B. V. R. Co. v. Blackshear, 106
Tex. 515, 172 S.W. 544 (1915). Cf. Pittsfield Cottonwear Mfg. Co. v. Pittsfield Shoe Co.,
71 N.H. 522, 53 A. 807 (1902).
47 See cases cited supra note 41. Also Ramsey v. Carolina-Tennessee Power Co., 195
N.C. 788, 143 S.E. 861 (1928); Walmsley v. Rural Tel. Assn., 102 Kan. 139, 169 P.
197 (1917); Jackson v. Galveston, H. & S.A. R. Co., 90 Tex. 372, 38 S.W. 745 (1897);
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that they never saw the point of duty, but there is in them so much
explicit consideration of the bearing of foreseeability that they seem
rather to have decided it, under another name. 48
Such is the state of the law. It is one of troubled waters, in which
any one may fish.

Duty
The first problem in Palsgraf with which one must come to grips is
the significance of duty. It means, of course, an obligation, to which
the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to some standard of
conduct toward another. The concept as such is unknown to the
continental law, which has got along comfortably enough on the basis
that fault is absolute and not relative and a limitation only on the basis ·
of the nature or remoteness of the consequences.49 It was apparently
equally unknown to the early English law, which proceeded upon
much the same basis.50 The fault which is absolute remains in the
criminal law, and in the £eld of intentional torts, where the doctrine
of "transferred intent" makes anyone who attempts to inflict physical
injury upon another liable to any stranger whom he may accidentally
injure instead.51 It was only when negligence began to take form as a
Wallin v. Eastern R. Co., 83 Minn. 149, 86 N.W. 76 (1901). Cf. Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 234 N.W. 372 (1931); Christianson v. Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. R. Co.,
67 Minn. 94, 69 N.W. 640 (1896).
This was true particularly in the cases of fires spreading to an unusual distance. Smith
v. London & S.W. R. Co., L.R. 6 C.P. 14 (1870); Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Stanford,
12 Kan. 354, 15 Am. St. Rep. 362 (1874); Hoyt v. Jeffers, 30 Mich. 181 (1874); Kuhn
v. Jewett, 32 N.J. Eq. 647 (1880); Poeppers v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 67 Mo. 715, 29
Am. Rep. 518 (1878); Fent v. Toledo, P. & W. R. Co., 59 ill. 349, 14 Am. Rep. 13
(1871); E.T. & H. K. Ide v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 83 Vt. 66, 74 A. 401 (1909). Contra:
Ryan v. New York Central R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210, 91 Am. Dec. 49 (1866); Hoag & Alger
v. Lake Shore & M.S. R. Co., 85 Pa. 293, 27 Am. Rep. 653 (1877).
48As illustrating the two approaches, compare Wood v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 177 Pa.
306, 35 A. 699 (1896), which went on proximate cause, with Dahlstrom v. Shrum, 368
Pa. 423, 84 A. (2d) 289 (1951), which went off on duty. Is there any difference between
the two opinions, except one of terminology?
49 So, at least, says Buckland, "The Duty to Take Care," 51 L.Q. REv. 637 (1935).
He analyzes, however, only the Roman law. My colleague, Dr. Ehrenzweig, considers that
the requirement of "Rechtswidrigkeit" in German and Austrian law, and the doctrinal
elements of the French "faute" come out at much the same place. See LAwsoN, NEGLIGENCE IN THE 0rvu, I.Aw 30-31 (1950).
50Winfield, "Duty in Tortious Negligence," 34 CoL. L. REv. 41 (1934); 2 HoLDsWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 50-54 (1931); 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH
I.Aw 375-382 (1931).
51 Talmage v. Smith, 101 Mich. 370, 59 N.W. 656 (1894); Peterson v. Haffner, 59
Ind. 130, 26 Am. Rep. 81 (1877); Davis v. Collins, 69 S.C. 460, 48 S.E. 469 (1904);
Bannister v. Mitchell, 127 Va. 578, 104 S.E. 800 (1920); Carnes v. Thompson, (Mo.
1932) 48 S.W. (2d) 903; Morrow v. Flores, (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) 225 S.W. (2d) 621;
TORTS RESTATEMENT §§16, 20.
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separate basis of tort liability that the courts developed the idea of duty,
as a matter of some specific relation between the plaintiff and the
defendant, without which there could be no liability.52 We owe it to
three English cases,53 decided between 1837 and 1842. The period
of development was that of the industrial revolution, and it may be that
duty was a device by which the courts were seeking, more or less
unconsciously, to limit the responsibilities of growing industry within
some reasonable bounds.
Every one agrees that a duty must arise out of some "relation"
between the parties, but what that relation is no one ever has succeeded
in defining. Lord Esher once attempted54 to reduce it to a formula in
terms of foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff. He would have been
quite at home in the Palsgraf case; but ten years later5 5 he was forced
to repudiate his own words. The last forlorn attempt at some general
statement is that of Lord Atkin, in Donoghue 11. Stevenson: 56
"The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law,
you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer's question,
Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take
reasonable care to avoid acts and omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who,
then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be-persons
who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought
reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected
when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are
called in question."
Apply this to the recovery of a husband, a thousand miles away, for
loss of the services of his wife, injured in an automobile accident
through the negligence of the defendant, and we are lost indeed.
What makes it all very perplexing is that our ideas of relations
change, and duties with them. A little more than a century ago Lord
Abinger5 7 foresaw that "the most absurd and outrageous consequences,
52Win£eld, "Duty in Tortious Negligence," 34 CoL. L. R:sv. 41 (1934).
53 Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. (N.C.) 468 (1837); Langridge v. Levy, 2 M. & W.
519, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (1837); Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng.
Rep. 402 (1842).
54Jn Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503 at 509 (1883): "Whenever any person is by
circumstances placed in such a position with regard to another that every one of ordinary
sense who did think would at once recognize that if he did not use ordinary care and skill
in his own conduct with regard to those circumstances he would cause danger of injury to
the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such
danger."
55 In Le Lievre v. Gould, [1893] 1 Q.B. 491.
56 [1932] A.C. 562 at 580.
57 In Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
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to which I can see no limit, would ensue," if it should ever be held that
one party to a contract was under any obligation to anyone but his
immediate promisee. All the progeny of Mac Pherson, 58 with even the
belated concurrence of Massachusetts,59 have now given the lie to those
words in the case of the manufacturer who sells his goods; and the duty
is steadily extending to other types of contractors. 60 The question now
is whether the liability of the contract itself shall be extended from the
manufacturer to the ultimate consumer in the form of a warranty
running with the goods. 61 For more than two generations it has been
repeated that there can be no duty toward an unborn child; 62 now all of
a sudden the cases on prenatal injury are going the other way. 63 It
used to be held that one who gets himself into danger owes no duty to a
rescuer injured in saving him; 64 now all at once the duty is there. 65
It was once well settled law that one who negligently made misrepresentations could owe no possible duty to a third person into whose hands
they might come; 66 there is now respectable authority that in some
situations such a duty can be found. 67 It was once the law that a landlord leasing a small shop for the admission of the public owed no duty
58 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y.
59 Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64
60 Kalinowsky v. Truck Equipment Co., 237

382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
N.E. (2d) 693 (1946).
App. Div. 472, 261 N.Y.S. 657 (1933)
(repairman); Hudson v. Moonier, (8th Cir. 1939) 102 F. (2d) 96 (same); Hale v.
Depaoli, 33 Cal. (2d) 228, 201 P. (2d) 1 (1948) (building contractor); McDonnell v.
Wasenmiller, (8th Cir. 1934) 74 F. (2d) 320 (same); Wright v. Holland Furnace Co.,
186 Minn. 265, 243 N.W. 387 (1932) (same); Colbert v. Holland Furnace Co., 333 ill.
78, 164 N.E. 162 (1928) (same); ToRTS REsTATEMENT §404.
61 Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 S. 305 (1927); Klein v.
Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. (2d) 272, 93 P. (2d) 799 (1939); Dothan Chero-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Weeks, 16 Ala. App. 639, 80 S. 734 (1918); Jacob E. Decker & Sons v.
Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W. (2d) 828 (1942).
62 For example, Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. St.
Rep. 242 (1884); Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921).
63 Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E. (2d) 334 (1949);
Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E. (2d) (1950); Verkennes v. Comiea, 229
Minn. 365, 38 N.W. (2d) 838 (1949); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, (Md. 1951) 79 A. (2d)
550; Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E. (2d) 691 (1951). The last named case
is of particular importance, since it overrules the leading decision, Drobner v. Peters, supra
note 62.
64 Saylor v. Parsons, 122 Iowa 679, 98 N.W. 500 (1904); Linz v. McDonald, (Tex.
Civ. App. 1911) 133 S.W. 535.
65 Butler v. Jersey Coast News Co., 109 N.J.L. 255, 160 A. 659 (1932); Camey v.
Buyea, 271 App. Div. 338, 65 N.Y.S. (2d) 902 (1946); Brugh v. Bigelow, 310 Mich. 74,
16 N.W. (2d) 668 (1944); Longacre v. Reddick, (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) 215 S.W. (2d)
404. Cf. Dodson v. Maddox, 359 Mo. 742, 223 S.W. (2d) 434 (1949).
66 See, for example, Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 25 L. Ed. 621 (1879?.
67 Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922); Anderson v. Spnestersbach, 69 Wash. 393, 125 P. 166 (1912); Dickle v. Nashville Abstract Co., 89 Tenn. 431,
14 S.W. 896 (1890); Economy Building & Loan Assn. v. West Jersey Title & Guarantee
,Co., 64 N.J.L. 27, 44 A. 854 (1899); Western Loan & Savings Co. v. Silver Bow Abstract
,Co., 31 Mont. 448, 78 P. 774 (1904); Mulroy v. Wright, 185 Minn. 84, 240 N.W. 116
{1931); Figuers v. Fly, 137 Tenn. 358, 193 S.W. 117 (1917).
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to those who entered; 68 all of the recent cases agree that the duty is
clear. 69
These are shifting sands, and no fit foundation. There is a duty
if the court says there is a duty; the law, like the Constitution, is what
we make it. Duty is only a word with which we state our conclusion
that there is or is not to be liability; it necessarily begs the essential
question. When we £nd a duty, breach and damage, everything has
been said. The word serves a useful purpose in directing attention to
the obligation to be imposed upon the defendant, rather than the causal
sequence of events; beyond that it serves none. In the decision whether
or not there is a duty, many factors interplay: the hand of history, our
ideas of morals and justice, the convenience of administration of the
rule, and our social ideas as to where the loss should fall.7° In the end
the .court will decide whether there is a duty on the basis of the mores
of the community, "always keeping in mind the fact that we endeavor
to make a rule in each case that will be practical and in keeping with
the general understanding of mankind."11
Does the railroad, then, owe a duty to Mrs. Palsgraf not to injure
her in this way? Why, yes, if the court 6.nds that it does. There is no
other answer. Leaving out of account, as did the New York court, the
fact that the woman was a passenger, there is still a relation to be found
between the parties. It is the relation of close proximity in time, space,
and direct causal sequence, between a negligent defendant and the
person he injures. Many courts, in whatever language, have held this
to be enough. If a count be made of all of the existing cases of "direct"
physical injury to the unforeseeable plaintiff, the result is probably a
slight majority in the plaintiff's favor. Almost as many courts have
said no. The problem remains unanswered.
It does not help to ask, what is the purpose of the rule which
requires railroads to use proper care in aiding passengers to board trains;
and is it to protect people on the platform from injuries brought about
68 See, for example, Bender v. Weber, 250 Mo. 551, 157 S.W. 570 (1913); Clark v.
Chase Hotel Co., 230 Mo. App. 739, 74 S.W. (2d) 498 (1934); TonTs REsTATEMENT
§359.
69 Webel v. Yale University, 125 Conn. 515, 7 A. (2d) 215 (1939); Senner v. Danewolf, 139 Ore. 93, 6 P. (2d) 240 (1932); Wood v. Prudential Ins. Co., 212 Minn. 551,
4 N.W. (2d) 617 (1942); Turner v. Kent, 134 Kan. 574, 7 P. (2d) 513 (1932); Gilligan
v. Blakesley, 93 Colo. 370, 26 P. (2d) 808 (1933); Warner v. Lucey, 207 App. Div. 241,
201 N.Y.S. 658 (1923), affd. 238 N.Y. 638, 144 N.E. 924 (1924).
70 See Green, "The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases,'' 28 CoL. L. REv. 1014
(1928), 29 CoL. L. REv. 255 (1929), reprinted in GREEN, JUDGE AND JtmY, c. 3. (1930).
71 Andrews, J., dissenting in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 at 354355, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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by unexpected explosions?72 The answer is, yes, if we make it so. We
are not dealing here with a statute, written down in express words and
limited by policy and tradition to the accomplishment of a legislative
purpose. It is the court itself which makes the rule. There is, as a
matter of fact, no tort rule whatever that a railroad may not be as
negligent as it pleases. There is only a rule that if it is negligent it will
be liable for damage. It will be liable for some damage to some people:
but not for all damage to everyone. In deciding whether it shall be
liable for this particular damage, it is of no aid to ask whether the rule
we make is to extend to it. That is merely a dog chasing its own tail.
Foreseeability and Risk

We come next to the effect on this nebulous "duty" of the fact that
the damage was, or was not, reasonably to be foreseen by a reasonable
man in the position of the defendant. It needs no argument to show
that duty does not always coincide with the foreseeable risk. The
expert swimmer, with a boat at hand, who sees another drowning
before his eyes, may sit on the dock, smoke his pipe, and watch him
drovm. 73 But it is still possible, as Cardozo contended, that the risk
may be an outer boundary beyond which duty cannot extend, and that
there is never any duty as to the unforeseeable plaintiff or the unforeseeable damage.
Over this there is an ancient controversy which goes back to Baron
Pollock74 in 1850. One position, of which Professor Seavey75 is the
modem protagonist, is that the risk which determines the existence of
negligence in the first instance limits the recovery for it, and that the
same factors which characterize the conduct as wrongful define the
scope of liability for its consequences. The other is that what the
defendant might foresee is important in determining whether he was at
fault at all but is not decisive as to the extent of the consequences for
which, once negligent, he will be liable. 76 The courts have fluctuated
72 See Gregory, "Proximate Cause in Negligence-A Retreat from Rationalization,'' 6
Umv. Cm. L. REv. 36 at 57-58 (1938).
1s Osterlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 301 (1928). Cf. Hurley v. Eddingfield,
156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901); Allen v. Hixson, 111 Ga. 460, 36 S.E. 810 (1900);
Riley v. Gulf, C. & S.F. R. Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) 160 S.W. 595; Toadvine v.
Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. R. Co., (D.C. Ky. 1937) 20 F. Supp. 226.
74 In Greenland v. Chaplin, 5 Ex. 243, 155 Eng. Rep. 104 (1850).
75 Seavey, ''Principles of Torts,'' 56 HARV. L. REv. 72 (1942); Seavey, "Mr. Justice
Cardozo and the Law of Torts," 52 HARV. L. REv. 372 (1939), 48 YALE L.J. 390 (1939),
39 CoL. L. REv. 20 (1939). See also Eldredge, ''The Role of Foreseeable Consequences
in Negligence Law,'' 23 PA. B.A.Q. 158 (1952).
76 The classic statement of this position is by Mitchell, J., in Christianson v. Chicago,
St. P. M. & 0. R. Co., 67 Minn. 94, 69 N.W. 640 (1896).
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and vacillated between the two positions, and neither has been adopted
with entire consistency or carried to all of its logical conclusions.
In support of the limitation of liability to the foreseeable risk, it has
been contended that it is more just, since the damages are consistent
with the fault, and negligence may be only a slight deviation from the
social standard, while its consequences may be out of all proportion to
it. It is certainly more just from the point of view of the defendant,
but it may be doubted that the plaintiff will appreciate the justice. The
plaintiff has been hurt and some one must bear the loss. Essentially
the choice is between an innocent plaintiff and a defendant who is
admittedly at fault. If the loss is out of all proportion to the defendant's
fault, it can be no less out of proportion to the plaintiff's innocence. If
it is unjust to the defendant to make him bear the loss ·which he could
not have foreseen, it is no less unjust to the plaintiff to make him bear
a loss which he too could not have foreseen and which is not even due
to his ovvn negligence but to that of another. In these cases there is no
justice to be had.
It has been said that the limitation is more rational, since it is more
consistent with the "underlying theory" of negligence. This is true if
we postulate an underlying theory of negligence in the abstract without
its consequences; but there is no such ·thing. A cause of action for
negligence must include damages as well as fault; and when we come to
state a theory as to whether the plaintiff's damage is included as compensable, we are once more begging the question. Once again the dog
chases its tail.
It has been said finally that the limitation is easier to administer,
since it fixes the nearest thing to a definite boundary that is possible
and gives us a degree of predictable certainty in the law. Predictable
certainty and facility of administration are very desirable things if they
are not purchased at too great a price. What degree of certainty does
the limitation of foreseeable risk bring to these cases?
It is relatively easy to say that the total risk, made up of the
aggregate of all the possibilities of harm, large or small, probable or
fantastic, is so great that the reasonable man of ordinary prudence
·would not drive at an excessive speed. It is quite another matter to say
that any one fragment of that risk, consisting of the particular consequences that have in fact occurred, would have been sufficient in
itself for the reasonable man to have it in mind and be deterred, or that
it is so significant a part of the whole that liability should attach to it.
Herein lies the distinction between the original fault and its results.
It is clearly foreseeable that the speeding driver may hit another car
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and kill a man. But what of the possibility that he may only bruise a
shin, and cancer may develop from the bruise?77 Or that the car with
which he collides may be thrown out of control and hit a third car, or
even a fourth? 78 Or that he will hit a man, whose body will be thrown
several feet through the air and injure a person on the sidewalk?79 Or
that he will narrowly miss a pregnant woman, who will be frightened
into a miscarriage;80 or that he will injure her unborn child? 81 Or that
he will endanger a child in the street, and its rescuer will sustain a
broken arm?82 Or that the person he injures may be left helpless in
the street and be run over by another car?83 Or that he will hit a power
line pole, mix up electric wires and start a fire, or kill a workman
operating a machine two miles away?84 Or that he will hit a man
carrying a shotgun, and the gun will be discharged, and a bystander be
shot in the leg? 85 There is a mathematical chance of all of these
possibilities. All of them have occurred, and can occur again; and all
of them have been held "proximate" by some court. But which of them
are "foreseeable" in the sense of being a significant part of the risk
recognizable in advance? 86
Such piecemeal foresight is a rope of sand, and offers neither
certainty nor convenience, as the B.oundering in the cases seems to show.
Here is Learned Hand, a great judge, blandly assuring us that it is
beyond reasonable anticipation that a barge with which the defendant
collides will sink, and will be carrying insurance.87 Here is Pennsylvania, twice88 asserting that no reasonable man could foresee that any
77 Cf. Baltimore City Passenger R. Co. v. Kemp, 61 Md. 74 (1884); Allison v. Fredericksburg, 112 Va. 243, 71 S.E. 525 (1911); Shaw v. Owl Drug Co., 4 Cal. App. (2d)
191, 40 P. (2d) 588 (1935).
78 Cf. Springer v. Pacific Fruit Exchange, 92 Cal. App. 732, 268 P. 951 (1928).
79 Cf. Solomon v. Branfman, 175 N.Y.S. 835 (App. Term 1919); Wolfe v. Checker
Taxi Co., 299 Mass. 225, 12 N.E. (2d) 849 (1938); Dahlstrom v. Shrum, 368 Pa. 423,
84 A. (2d) 289 (1951).
80 Purcell v. St. Paul City R. Co., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892).
81 Cf. Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, (Md. 1951) 79 A. (2d) 550.
82 Cf. Eckert v. Long Island R. Co., 43 N.Y. 502, 3 Am. Rep. 721 (1871).
83 Cf. Morrison v. Medaglia, 287 Mass. 46, 191 N.E. 133 (1934); Adams v. Parish,
189 Ky. 628, 225 S.W. 467 (1920); Thornton v. Eneroth, 177 Wash. 1, 30 P. (2d) 951
(1934).
84 Cf. Ramsey v. Carolina-Tennessee Power Co., 195 N.C. 788, 143 S.E. 861 (1928);
Mize v. Rocky Mountain Bell Tel. Co., 38 Mont. 521, 100 P. 971 (1909).
85 Cf. Walmsley v. Rural Tel. Assn., 102 Kan. 139, 169 P. 197 (1917).
86 See Gregory, "Proximate Cause in Negligence-A Retreat from Rationalization," 6
UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 35 at 60 (1938). The substance of this paragraph is repeated, with
apology, from Prosser, "Proximate Cause in California,'' 38 CALIF. L. REv. 369 at 396
(1950).
87 Sinram v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (2d Cir. 1932) 61 F. (2d) 767.
88Wood v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 177 Pa. 306, 35 A. 699 (1896); Dahlstrom v. Shrum,
368 Pa. 423, 84 A. (2d) 289 (1951). With the Wood case in mind, I once asked the
engineer of a fast train what would happen if he hit a man. He said, "Well, last week we
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object struck by a speeding train or bus would B.y off at an angle and hit
a person not directly in its path. Here is Wisconsin,89 affirming that
when a child is run down in the street there is no recognizable risk that
its mother, in the vicinity, may suffer mental shock. Here is New
York,90 solemnly declaring that the foreseeability of the spread of £re
ends at the :6.rst adjoining house. I do not believe these things. I think
they are rubbish. At the other extreme is another New York case,91
:finding it all foreseeable when a collision forced a taxicab over a sidewalk and into a building, and loosened a stone, which fell upon a
bystander and killed her, while the taxicab was being removed twenty
minutes later by a wrecking car. There is also Texas,92 which had no
difficulty at all in foreseeing that a mudhole left by a defendant in a
highway would stall a car, that a rescuer attempting to tow it out would
get his wooden leg stuck in the mud, and that a loop in the tow rope
would lasso his good leg and break it. Illustrations might be multiplied,
as every negligence lawyer knows, but surely these are enough.
Foreseeability of risk, in short, carries only an illusion of certainty
in defining the consequences for which the defendant will be liable.
The attempt93 to broaden it by talking instead of consequences which
are "normal" to the risk, or reasonably attachable to it, or "not highly
extraordinary" in the light of it, seems in part at least to abandon the
original reasoning and adds nothing in the way of definiteness. One of
my students told me once that all this meant to him was that what
happened should not be "too cockeyed and far-fetched." If that is true,
why not look to the cockeyed consequences themselves rather than to
the original fault?
Transferred Negligence

The question to which Cardozo and Andrews devoted most of their
argument was whether negligence can be transferred-that is to say,
hit a pig. It flew off at an angle of nearly 45 degrees for almost a hundred yards, and
narrowly missed a fellow in a field." I refuse to believe that this particular hazard is
unknown to the railroads.
89 Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
90Ryan v. New York Central R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210, 91 Am. Dec. 49 (1866).
91 In re Guardian Casualty Co., 253 App. Div. 360, 2 N.Y.S. (2d) 232 (1938).
92 Hines v. Morrow, (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) 236 S.W. 183. Morris, in "Proximate
Cause in Minnesota," 34 Mnm. L. REv. 185 at 193 (1950), points out the extent to which
a skillful advocate may influence the court's view as to what is foreseeable by his statement
of the facts. He illustrates this by the Texas peg-leg case, where the court quoted the
following statement of the facts from the plaintiff's brief: "The case stated in briefest form,
is simply this: Appellee was on the highway, using it in a lawful manner, and slipped into
this hole, created by appellant's negligence, and was injured in attempting to extricate
himself."
93 See Bohlen, ''Review of Harper, A Treatise on the Law of Torts," 47 HARV. L.
REv. 556 (1934).
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whether Mrs. Palsgraf, who was in no way foreseeably endangered,
could base her cause of action on the railroad's negligence toward the
man with the package. "Transferred intent" is familiar enough; the
defendant who intentionally shoots at A is liable when he unforeseeably
hits B instead. 94 The fault is regarded as absolute rather than relative,
and the fact that a new person has entered the picture makes no
difference. The doctrine comes down from the action of trespass, with
its criminal origin, and it has been more or less strictly limited to the
direct and immediate application of force to person or property.95 Its
survival may be due to the close association of intentional torts such as
battery with the criminal law. It may be due rather to a definite
feeling that the intentional wrongdoer should make good the direct and
immediate damage to a stranger. From the cases, it is impossible to say.
Transferred negligence is not altogether unknown to the law.
There are, for example, the "derivative" actions of a husband or parent
for loss of the services of his injured wife or child;96 and it is still good
law that an employer has a similar action for a negligent injury to his
employee. 97 These are ancient actions, long antedating the whole idea
of duty, and they are founded upon a special relation, amounting to
legal status, between the defendant and the third person, and upon
actual injury to the latter. Certainly there is no general rule that
negligence is transferred; but are these the only instances in which
recovery may be based upon negligence toward another?
Let us take a case. The defendant, delivering a parcel, drives his
truck up a private driveway to the back door of a home. On the way up
he notices at the side of the driveway a large paper box or carton, open
and visibly empty. Two minutes later, corning down the driveway, he
negligently runs over the box. Negligently, because he knows it is
there, it may be owned by some one, and it has some small value. In
the meantime a two-yea:i;-old child, whose presence could not reasonably
See cases cited supra note 51.
Cf. Com v. Sheppard, 179 Minn. 490, 229 N.W. 869 (1930), where the defendant
wrongfully shot at a dog and hit the plaintiff, with Renner v. Canfield, 36 Minn. 90, 30
N.W. 435 (1886), where he merely frightened the plaintiff.
96 It is generally held that the contributory negligence of the wife or child will prevent
the plaintiff's recovery. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Honey, (8th Cir. 1894) 63 F. 39;
Winner v. Oakland, 158 Pa. 405, 27 A. 1110 (1893); Cawley v. La Crosse City R. Co.,
106 Wis. 239, 82 N.W. 197 (1900); Callies v. Reliance Laundry Co., 188 Wis. 376, 206
N.W. 198 (1925); Wueppesahl v. Connecticut Co., 87 Conn. 710, 89 A. 166 (1913);
Bonefont v. Chapdelaine, 131 Me. 45, 158 A. 857 (1932).
97 Ames v. Union R. Co., 117 Mass. 541, 19 Am. Rep. 426 (1875); Coal Land
Development Co. v. Chidester, 86 W.Va. 561, 103 S.E. 923 (1920); Darmour Productions
Corp. v. Herbert M. Baruch Corp., 135 Cal. App. 351, 27 P. (2d) 664 (1933); Bradford
Corp. v. Webster, [1920] 2 K.B. 135.
94
95
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be anticipated, has concealed himself in the box. Is the defendant
liable for the death of the child?
I cannot believe that any court ever ·will say no. 98 If in the interval
the owner of the box had filled it with Dresden china, no one would
have any difficulty; nor can I see that it would make the slightest
difference if the china were owned by a stranger. The connection
benveen the box and its contents is too close, too obvious, too inseparable. The defendant has not run over an empty box; he has run over a
box with something in it. Why should the fact that a new person has
entered the case make all the difference? The situation is not unlike
that of the unborn child in the body of its mother, where recent
decisions have allowed recovery,99 and so far as I can discover recovery
never has been denied on the ground that the plaintiff's presence was
not to be foreseen. Or, if one wishes to be really fanciful, take the case
of the Siamese twins, where the defendant sees only one head and can
foresee only one person, but injures two.
Obviously what we have here is a very close connection, almost
identity, benveen the thing threatened and the person hit. Extend the
connection slightly; put the child outside of the box, but concealed
behind it-will the result be different? Not everyone will agree, but I
would say no. The child is still almost part of the box;100 the defendant
has run over no ordinary box, but a box which conceals a child. Extend
the connection still further; the child is five feet away and behind a
bush, invisible and unforeseeable, and the box Hies against him and
injures him. Here, with the exception of those of Pennsylvania,101 the
cases are agreed that the plaintiff can recover.102 The connection is one
of close proximity in time and space, and direct and immediate application of force. It is the connection of the old action of trespass and of
the cases of "transferred intent." Nor is this process of extension
merely a piece of professor's classroom sleight of hand. It is the process
of the early cases on "proximate cause," in which the Squib Case103
bulked very large.
98 The facts stated are somewhat altered from those in Meeks Motor Freight v. Ham's
Admr., 302 Ky. 71, 193 S.W. (2d) 745 (1945), where the driver had no specific reason
to believe the box to be empty. The court ignored any question of negligence toward the
owner of the box, apparently assuming it to be abandoned property, and made the instruction turn on some notice to the driver that there might be something inside it.
99 See cases cited supra note 63.
100 Cf. John C. Kupferle Foundry Co. v. St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Terminal R. Co.,
275 Mo. 451, 205 S.W. 57 (1918) (tank, with factory behind it).
101 See cases cited supra notes 40 and 4 I.
102 See cases cited supra note 41.
103 Scott v. Shepherd, 3 Wils. 403, 95 Eng. Rep. 1124 (1773).
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How far can the pr~cess be carried? Does it extend to Mrs. Palsgraf? Once more the answer is, it does if we make it so. Put the
child thirty feet away, and dynamite in the box, and you have the case
in its essence. Once it is conceded that negligence can be transferred
to closely connected plaintiffs, the question becomes only one of where
to draw the line. We have reached the area of disagreement. There
are many cases104 which, under the name of "proximate cause," have
allowed recovery to persons and consequences even more remote.
The quest of the "proximate" does not solve the problem. It adds
nothing in the way of certainty or convenience; if anything, it only
increases our difficulties, although perhaps not as much as the illusory
certainty of the "area of risk'' would suggest. All that it does is to direct
attention to the plaintiff as well as the defendant, to the role of the
consequences as well as that of the fault. The one approach is at least
as logical as the other; but whether we adopt one or the other we can
only beg the essential question, whether the negligent defendant shall
be liable for the damage he has done.
Reduced to its lowest terms, the problem is one of the imposition of
liability without fault, or in excess of fault, over and above the liability
consistent with the fault. When a man with a weak heart is struck a
light and glancing blow and drops dead, we have no trouble in saying
that the liability must exceed the fault. 105 The connection is too close,
and too clear. Nor is there any difficulty where the result that was to be
expected is brought about in a fantastic manner-as, for example,
where a passenger is endangered in a railroad collision, and an engine
is thrown out of control, runs around a circular track, and injures him
in a second collision instead.106 It is when we get a different kind of
injury that our troubles begin. No one doubts that the man with the
package, to which alone harm was threatened, could have recovered for
the destruction of his £reworks. That is the child in the box. But what
if the explosion had put out his eye?
104 See cases cited supra notes
105 Larson v. Boston Elevated

41, 45, 47.
R. Co., 212 Mass. 262, 98 N.E. 1048 (1912); Neff v.
City of Cameron, 213 Mo. 350, lll S.W. 1139 (1908); Ross v. Great Northern R. Co.,
101 Minn. 122, lll N.W. 951 (1907); Champlin Refining Co. v. Thomas, (10th Cir.
1937) 93 F. (2d) 133; McCahill v. New York Transp. Co., 201 N.Y. 221, 94 N.E. 616
(19ll); Ominsky v. Charles Weinhagen & Co., ll3 Minn. 422, 129 N.W. 845 (1911).
106 Bunting v. Hogsett, 139 Pa. 363, 21 A. 31 (1890). Cf. Hill v. Winsor, ll8 Mass.
251 (1875); Selleck v. Lake Shore & M.S. R. Co., 93 Mich. 375, 53 N.W. 556 (1892);
Hoeppner v. Southern Hotel Co., 142 Mo. 378, 44 S.W. 257 (1897); Gilson v. Delaware
& Hudson Canal Co., 65 Vt. 213, 26 A. 70 (1892); Foss v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 151
Minn. 506, 187 N.W. 609 (1922); Pulaski Gas Light Co. v. McClintock, 97 Ark. 576,
134 S.W. 1189 (1911); Burklund v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 56 Idaho 703, 58 P. (2d)
773 (1936).
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Cardozo "assumes without deciding"107 that he would recover. On
the basis of the very close and obvious connection, and the very direct
causal sequence, I should say that he would; and I know of no case that
has said, in a parallel situation, that he would not. This is the situation
of In re Polemis,1° 8 itself apparently approved by the Restatement,1° 9
where a plank dropped into the hold of a ship might have been expected
to smash cargo but instead set off an explosion of petrol vapor which
destroyed it by £re. But if the man with the package can recover for
the loss of his eye, I cannot see that there is any sense, except as an
arbitrary rule to get rid of the case, in a distinction according to the
person who is injured. There is a fundamental and foolish inconsistency in saying that a defendant who threatens injury to A is liable
for unforeseeable consequences to A, whether they be death from a
weak heart or loss of an eye, but is not liable for the same unforeseeable
consequences to B, who is standing beside A and virtually in his shoes.
Put Mrs. Palsgraf on the train beside the passenger, with both of them
injured by the explosion; is it not utter nonsense to say that recovery
turns on which of them owns the package?110
Nor can I :find any support whatever in the decisions for the
suggestion of Cardozo,1 11 which was originally Bohlen's,112 that an
arbitrary distinction is to be drawn according to the type of interest
invaded, and that there is a difference between person and property,
between the package and eye.113 Professor Goodhart has expressed
alarm at "the terrifying prospect of a whole new series of cases in which
it will be necessary to consider whether or not a person has the same
interest in his foot and his eye, in his two adjoining houses, in his ship
101paJsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 at 346, 162 N.E. 99
108 In re Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 560.
109 ToRTS REsTATEMENT §433, comment e.
110 "The distinction is acutely presented when the actor has committed a

(1928).

wrong to one
person, which in a train of unpredictable events involves another. In Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R. Co., •.. the court held that the defendant was not liable to the second person.
If not, it is hard to see why it should make a difference that a single person is twice injured,
once in a way that entails liability, and second, in such a way, as standing alone would be
too remote. If he is so liable, a difference in ownership of the two pieces of property,
successively injured, might exonerate a wrongdoer as to that injured last, though he would
be liable, had both been owned by a single person-scarcely a relevant distinction." Learned
Hand, C.J., in The Glendola, (2d Cir. 1931) 47 F. (2d) 206 at 207.
111 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 at 346-347, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
112 Cf. TORTS RESTATEMENT §281, comment g.
113 Cf. John C. Kupferle Foundry Co. v. St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Terminal R. Co.,
275 Mo. 451, 205 S.W. 57 (1918) (tank and factory); Knowlton v. New York & N.E. R.
Co., 147 Mass. 606, 18 N.E. 580 (1888) (two adjoining lots). The contention of the
Restatement was advanced by the dissenting opinion of Jaggard, J., in Lesch v. Great
Northern R. Co., 97 Minn. 503, 106 N.W. 955 (1906), where the plaintiff recovered for
mental anguish following the invasion of her property; but it was rejected by the majority
of the court.
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and the cargo which it carries."114 This has been dismissed with scorn
as "the usual cry of the reactionary when faced with a new development,"115 but if so, the new development is one as yet unknown to
the courts.
Where I come out, I think, is with the conclusion that the despised
word "proximate" has more in the way of meaning and merit than it
usually is given credit for; that all this is utterly incapable of reduction
to any formula; and that the formula of the scope of the risk and the
foreseeability of either the plaintiff or the consequences is as vague, as
empty, as unworkable, and as unsatisfactory an explanation of what is
actually in the cases as even the physical mechanics of Beale.116
The Problem of the Place to Stop
So far this has been a brief for Andrews; but more remains to be
said. There is still the problem of an end to liability, of a place to stop.
It is still unthinkable that any one shall be liable to the end of time for
all of the results that follow in endless sequence from his single act.
Causation cannot be the answer; in a very real sense the consequences
of an act go forward to eternity, and back to the beginning of the world.
Any attempt to impose responsibility on such a basis would result in
infinite liability for all wrongful acts, which would "set society on edge
and :611 the courts with endless litigation."117 To causation there is no
end at all; and the preoccupation of the courts with the mechanism of
causation is the source of much of our woe. Unless we can £ind some
other way to limit liability short of what the act has clearly caused, we
may be forced back to the scope of the foreseeable risk, unsatisfactory
as it is, as the only available alternative to unlimited liability. It is of no
aid to say, with Andrews,118 that the question is one of "practical
politics," or with Edgerton119 that it is merely one of "justice." All of
the law is a combination of both, and neither ever has been defined to
the satisfaction of anyone. It is cold comfort either to the lawyer
seeking to decide whether to settle his case, or to the judge seeking to
decide how to decide it, to be told that there is "little to guide us other
than common sense."120
114 Goodhart, ''The Unforeseeable Consequences of a Negligent Act," 39 YALE L.J.
449 at 467 (1930).
115 Tilley, ''The English Rule as to Liability for Unintended Consequences," 33
MxcH. L. REv. 829 at 850 (1935).
116 Beale, "The Proximate Consequences of an Act," 33 HAllv. L. REv. 633 (1920).
117Mitchell, J., in North v. Johnson, 58 Minn. 242, 59 N.W. 1012 (1894).
11s Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 at 352, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
119 Edgerton, ''Legal Cause," 72 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 211 at 238 (1924).
120 Andrews, J., in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 at 354, 162 N.E.
99 (1928).
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The only alternative to the "scope of the risk" to be found in the
cases is "direct causation." This comes down to us from the old action
of trespass and the Squib Case, and it represents the earliest attempt,
still pursued by many courts, to find some close connection between the
defendant's act and the damage done. "Direct causation" is easier of
comprehension than of definition. "Direct" consequences are those
which follow in unbroken sequence from the effect of the defendant's
act upon conditions existing and forces already in operation at the time,
without the intervention of any external forces which come into active
operation later. There is an analogy, often mentioned, to knocking
over the first of a row of blocks, after which all of the rest fall down ·
without the aid of any other force. Palsgraf is a typical case of direct
causation: the guard knocked loose the package, its fall caused the
explosion, the explosion knocked over· the scale, the scale hit the
plaintiff. Nothing intervened. Many courts have said, at least, that
"direct" consequences are always proximate, and recoverable, whatever
their nature and whoever the plaintiff may be. Andrews does not go so
far; but his chief reason for permitting Mrs. Palsgraf to recover is that
the injury to her was direct.
This has been condemned, and rightly so, as laying an entirely
undue emphasis on mere physics. It has been pointed out that any
application of a theory of "direct causation" may require an arbitrary
disregard of a number of intervening factors, and a selection of those to
be regarded as significant. This is true, but it may not be too
important. Actually the courts have had little difficulty with it. When
a man is given poison it is easy enough to ignore all the complex
chemical reactions brought about in his stomach by the food he puts into
it for the next week and to concentrate on the simple fact that the poison
killed him. 121
The difficulty is rather that direct causation draws no satisfactory
line. Its consequences may go entirely too far. It is true that they are
limited, not by foreseeability, but by the existing situation on which the
defendant acts, the way the stage is set. They are not infinite but they
may still be fantastic. Recognizing this, Andrews proposes a limitation
based on the foreseeability of each step in the series, looking forward
from the last.122 Given the explosion, is it foreseeable that it will knock
121 McLaughlin, ''Proximate Cause," 39 HARv.
122 " ••• What should be foreseen? No human

L. REv. 149 (1925).
foresight would suggest that a collision
itself might injure one a block away. On the contrary, given an explosion, such a possibility might be reasonably expected. I think the direct connection, the foresight of which
the courts speak, assumes prevision of the explosion, for the immediate results of which, at
least, the chauffeur is responsible." Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 at
355, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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over the scale? Given the falling scale, is it foreseeable that it will strike
Mrs. Palsgraf? It needs only a moment's reflection to see where this
goes. Mrs. Palsgraf falls on another package, which explodes and
knocks over a more distant scale, which hits Mrs. O'Shaughnessy, who
falls on another-but what we are getting is a Rube Goldberg cartoon.
Nor, of course, is "direct causation" of any help once we pass the
boundary of directness and consider the effect of other causes which
intervene later in point of time. In determining whether they supersede the defendant's liability, the courts have been forced back to something like the foreseeable risk, although actually they have gone far
beyond the limits of what any reasonable defendant would actually contemplate as the consequences of his act. The rescuer,1 23 the negligent
doctor who aggravates the original injury,1 24 the pneumonia which
carries off the victim while he lies in the hospital,1 25 the second injury
which occurs while he is trying to walk on crutches,1 26 the frantic effort
to escape which results in injury to the person threatened127 or to another,128 the second collision with the car thrown across the road,129
the second driver who runs over the man left helpless in the highway,130
are at least not possibilities that any reasonable man could be expected
to contemplate, think about, or have in mind while he is driving an
automobile. They have to be justified by calling them "normal" consequences, which appears to mean only that they are not unreasonably
123 Eckert v. Long Island R. Co., 43 N.Y. 502, 3 Am. Rep. 721 (1871); Bond v.
Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 82 W.Va. 557, 96 S.E. 932 (1918); Corbin v. Philadelphia, 195 Pa.
461, 45 A. 1070 (1900); Wagner v. International R. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437
(1921).
124 Sauter v. New York Central R. Co., 66 N.Y. 50, 23 Am. Rep. 18 (1876); Selleck
v. Janesville, 100 Wis. 157, 75 N.W. 975 (1898); Dewhirst v. Leopold, 194 Cal. 424,
229 P. 30 (1924).
.
125 Beauchamp v. Saginaw Mining Co., 50 Mich. 163, 15 N.W. 65 (1883); Anderson
v. Anderson, 188 Minn. 602, 248 N.W. 35 (1933); Wallace v. Ludwig, 292 Mass. 251,
198 N.E. 159 (1935).
126 Wagner v. Mittendorf, 232 N.Y. 481, 134 N.E. 539 (1922); Roseth v. Preston
Mill Co., 49 Wash. 682, 96 P. 423 (1908); Hyvonen v. Hector Iron Co., 103 Minn. 331,
ll5 N.W. 167 (1908); Squires v. Reynolds, 125 Conn. 366, 5 A. (2d) 877 (1939).
127Tuttle v. Atlantic City R. Co., 66 N.J.L. 327, 49 A. 450 (1901); Lawrence v.
Green, 70 Cal. 417, 11 P. 750 (1886); Twomley v. Central Park N. & E. R. Co., 69 N.Y.
158, 25 Am. Rep. 162 (1877).
12s Champagne v. A. Hamburger & Sons, 169 Cal. 683, 147 P. 954 (1915); Griffin
v. Hustis, 234 Mass. 95, 125 N.E. 387 (1919); Gedeon v. East Ohio Gas Co., 128 Ohio
St. 335, 190 N.E. 924 (1934).
120 Holmberg v. Villaume, 158 Minn. 442, 197 N.W. 849 (1924); Reed v. Ogden
& Moffett, 252 Mich. 362, 233 N.W. 345 (1930); Caylor v. B. C. Motor Transp. Co., 191
Wash. 365, 71 P. (2d) 162 (1937).
180 Morrison v. Medaglia, 287 Mass. 46, 191 N.E. 133 (1934); Thornton v. Eneroth,
177 Wash. 1, 30 P. (2d) 951 (1934); Adams v. Parish, 189 Ky. 628, 225 S.W. 467
(1920).
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disconnected with the defendant's conduct. Neither the risk theory nor
"directness" is of any real help in dealing with them.
For reasons such as these, the opinion of Andrews is as barren as is
Cardozo's. It does, I think, come closer to a recognition of the difficulties of the problem and the many factors that may bear on it, and
it is less arbitrary in postulating an ironclad rule; but the formula it
offers is no better as a universal solvent or a philosopher's stone.
What is the true reason that so many of us feel that the case was
correctly decided, and that Mrs. Palsgraf should not recover? It is not,
I think, that no harm to her was to be foreseen in the first instance. It is
that what did happen to her is too preposterous. Her connection with
the defendant's guards and the package is too tenuous; in the old language, she is too remote. The combination of events and circumstances
necessary to injure her is too improbable, too fantastic; it is, as my freshman so happily put it, "too cockeyed and far-fetched." He may have
given us a clue. The Restatement,1 31 groping for the same idea, says
that in retrospect it must not appear "highly extraordinary" that the
defendant's conduct has brought about the result. The Restatement's
comment:1 32 is unfortunate in the stress which it lays on retrospective
knowledge of all the facts, for to omniscience any event whatever must
appear not only probable but quite inevitable; but the basic idea is
there, that liability must stop somewhere short of the freakish and the
fantastic.
If there is any middle ground between the restricted scope of the
original risk on the one hand and the extreme lengths to which even
direct causation may be carried on the other, it must lie in some reasonably close connection between the harm threatened and the harm done.
If the connection clearly exists, as where the man with the weak heart
drops dead after a slight blow,1 33 quite unforeseeable consequences are
readily recoverable. Where it is more distant, consisting only of proximity in time and space and direct causal sequence, as where the object
struck by the vehicle Hies off at an angle and hits a bystander on the
sidewalk, events of a more or less routine and ordinary kind may lead to
recovery even though the court regards them as unforeseeable. When
131 TonTs RESTATEMENT §433. Cf. Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, (Wis.
1952) 55 N.W. (2d) 29 at 34: "Logic seems to be on the side of the dissenting opinion
[in Palsgraf], yet the majority opinion can be justified from the standpoint that judicial
policy warranted the result. The conscience of society might be shocked by imposing
liability in such a case."
132 TonTs REsTATEMENT §433, comment e.
133 This seems to be the obvious explanation of Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231,
177 N.E. 431 (1931).
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we reach Mrs. Palsgraf and the nightmare accident which injured her,
it may be time to stop.
All this answers no questions, provides no formula, and does not
help to state a rule. It is at most an approach, which may explain most
but not all of the cases, and may appeal to those who are happy neither
with Andrews nor with Cardozo. It suggests that the old words "proximate" and "remote," for which no one has had a kind word for half a
century, may provide the best available answer after all, and that, as is
sometimes the case where the courts continue to use a word for more
than a century, they mean just what they say.

The Riddle of the Palsgraf Case
We come at last to the riddle13 -t of the Palsgraf case: how can we
state a rule? Preliminary to this is the question, can the matter be
reduced to a rule at all; and preliminary to both is the question, what
value would a rule have if we could state it?
We are in a field of freak accidents, of crazy concatenations of circumstances, no one of which ever has been duplicated or ever will occur
in exactly the same way again. It is not likely that there will be another
Mrs. Palsgraf before judgment day. As a precedent her case is utterly
worthless unless we can extract from it some generalization, some guide
to a method of dealing with freak accidents, some prediction for the
unpredictable. But freak accidents, in the aggregate, follow no pattern
at all; and even where some superficial resemblance can be found, the
details will vary so greatly and significantly from case to case that we
may very well come, to different conclusions.135 A rule for the unpredictable is itself a contradiction in terms.
For what proposition of law does the Palsgraf case really stand?
Professor Cowan, in a sadly neglected article, has stated it as follows:
" . . . a railroad does not owe to an intending passenger the
duty to refrain from permitting its guards to push upon a moving
train another passenger carrying a package which, though innocent
in appearance, contains fireworks, and which, if joggled from the
boarding passenger's arm, will fall to the tracks, explode, shake the
platform, knock down the scales, and thus injure the intending
passenger."136
134 See Cowan, "The Riddle of the Palsgraf Case,'' 23 MINN. L.
185 Compare Kornmerstad v. Great Northern R. Co., 120 Minn.

REv. 46 (1938).

376, 139 N.W. 713
(1913), affd. 128 Minn. 505, 151 N.W. 177 (1915), where a horse struck by a train Hew
195 feet through the air, bounced, and hit the plaintiff, working in a field, with Dahlstrom
v. Shrum, 368 Pa. 423, 84 A. (2d) 289 (1951), where the plaintiff was a few feet away,
in the street and behind a bus. Of course it does not simplify matters that the first case
allowed recovery, while the second did not.
186 Cowan, "The Riddle of the Palsgraf Case," 23 MINN. L. REv. 46 at 56 (1938).
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As a guide to the decision of future cases, this is of course ridiculous.
There will be no such cases. But when we try to state the proposition
in more general terms we begin to include so many unpredictable factors which may affect our decision in any specific case that, as the rule
approaches sweeping generalization, it loses all validity as a rule. No
one would say, on the basis of the Palsgraf case, that a plaintiff can
never recover for an injury brought about by an explosion. No one
would say that there can be no recovery unless the event itself and the
manner of its occurrence could reasonably have been foreseen. It may
be quite as hazardous and unsound to say that no plaintiff can ever
recover unless harm to that plaintiff was to be foreseen. A rule can have
validity only as it applies to situations that recur without significant
differences. Freak accidents do not recur, and the differences which can
arise in them are virtually unlimited.
Take the problem of the carrier which delays goods in transit, with
the result that they are destroyed by an unforeseeable flood beyond all
human experience. The federal rule, which controls as to interstate
commerce, is that the carrier is not liable;137 many of the state courts
hold that it is.138 As a practical matter recovery may tum on the destination of the goods, which makes no sense. But however the problem
is to be decided it cannot be divorced from the fact that the defendant
is a carrier, and its responsibility for the goods is that of an insurer
against everything but "the act of God and the King's enemies." If the
carrier deviates from the prescribed route it becomes liable when the
goods are destroyed by an act of God in the course of the deviation;139
if it fails to make delivery of the goods after arrival it becomes liable
when the goods are so destroyed during the delay. 1 ·10 The question is
whether this responsibility extends to an act of God during delay in
transit. How can any rule as to the "scope of the risk" evolved from
two guards, a package of £.reworks and a scale aid in the slightest degree
in the solution of this question? Is it proper, in Palsgraf itself, so utterly
to ignore the fact that the plaintiff was a passenger, a person toward
137Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Reeves, 10 Wall. (77 U.S.) 176 (1870); Northwestern
Consolidated Milling Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 135 Minn. 363, 160 N.W. 1028
(1917); Rodgers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 75 Kan. 222, 88 P. 885 (1907); Seaboard Air
Line R. Co. v. Mullin, 70 Fla. 450, 70 S. 467 (1915).
13BBibb Broom Com Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co., 94 Minn. 269, 102 N.W.
709 (1905); Green-Wheeler Shoe Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co., 130 Iowa 123, 106
N.W. 498 (1906); Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Quarles, 145 Ala. 436, 40 S. 120
(1906).
139 Davis v. Garrett, 6 Bing. 716, 130 Eng. Rep. 1456 (1830); Seavey Co. v. Union
Transit Co., 106 Wis. 394, 82 N.W. 285 (1900); Louisville & C. Packet Co. v. Rogers,
20 Ind. App. 594, 49 N.E. 970 (1898).
140 Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Benson, 86 Ga. 203, 12 S.E. 357 (1890); East Tennessee
V. & G. R. Co. v. Kelly, 91 Tenn. 699, 20 S.W. 312 (1892).
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whom the defendant had undertaken an unusual obligation of protection, requiring the highest care and perhaps extended liability? It may
be that it makes no difference; but until the question is decided, is
Palsgraf really definite authority even for Palsgraf? Might not another
court, confronted by some miracle with a repetition of the facts, go off
on the point that was ignored?
Even where the problem appears to be essentially the sa~e, two
courts may have widely differing views on the desirable result as a
matter of social policy. New York holds that the liability of a railroad
which negligently sets a :6re terminates after the first adjoining building.141 Kansas, carrying direct causation to an extreme, holds that it
extends for at least four miles.142 New York is a state whose prosperity
depends upon railroads, heavy industry and similar enterprises, and its
courts always have been solicitous and fearful of an undue burden.143
They have had in mind urban communities, in which most property of
any value carries :6re insurance, and the possibility of a windfall for the
insurance companies in the form of subrogation claims.144 Kansas has
miles of uninsured wheat and its community attitude toward railroads
is by no means the same. Who is to say that each decision is not
defensible for the particular state? And what reason is there that the
two jurisdictions must come to one and the same conclusion?
As has been pointed out before, the defendants in these cases of
"proximate cause" are in large measure railroads, public utilities, municipal corporations, industrial enterprises, automobile owners and others
who are in a position, through rates, taxes or liability insurance, to pass
the inevitable damages resulting from their activities on to the general
public, or at least to distribute them over a relatively large group.145
141 Ryan v.

New York Central R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210, 91 Am. Dec. 49 (1866).
T. & S.F. R. Co. v. Stanford, 12 Kan. 354, 15 Am. Rep. 362 (1874).
143 Cf. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928);
Morse v. Buffalo Tank Corp., 280 N.Y. llO, 19 N.E. (2d) 981 (1939).
144 "It is to be considered, also, that if the negligent party is liable to the owner of a
remote building thus consumed, he would also be liable to the insurance companies who
should pay losses to such remote owners. The principle of subrogation would entitle the
companies to the benefit of every claim held by the party to whom a loss should be paid."
Ryan v. New York Central R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210 at 217, 91 Am. Dec. 49 (1866).
145 A count made in 1936 of 279 Minnesota cases on "proximate cause" revealed the
following list of defendants: railroads and street railways, 129; other public utilities, 24;
manufacturers, industrial concerns and public stores, 54; municipal corporations, 19; automobile owners, 20; other defendants (including physicians, individual employers, charitable
corporations and others who might well have carried liability insurance), 33.
A similar count made in 1950 of a total of 672 California cases resulted in the following list: railways, street railways and other carriers, 137; steamship lines, 8; public utilities,
68; manufacturers, industrial concerns and sellers of goods, 78; owners and occupiers of
land, 75; employers, 31; municipal and other government corporations, 24; contractors, 39;
automobile drivers, 137; physicians and surgeons, 22; notaries and other bonded officers, 13;
other defendants (including several who might well have carried liability insurance), 48.
142 Atchison,
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In the decision whether a particular loss is to be borne by such a defendant, originally at fault if only in a lesser way, or by the innocent and
helpless plaintiff, it cannot be supposed that this factor will be entirely
disregarded by the courts, nor can it be expected that all defendants and
all losses will be treated by all courts according to any one formula or
rule.
The bold and imaginative attempt of Professor Ehrenzweig1 46 to
reduce all this to "enterprise liability," and to hold the defendant liable
without fault, or at least in excess of his fault, for those damages which
· l" ofth e "enterprise,
· "but not f or oth er d amages not "typ1ca
· l"
are "typ1ca
,
does not seem to me to provide the answer. It may be, and no doubt
will be, the law of the year 2100, but it is not the present law, and the
effort to make out a case for it as already prevalent is too labored, and
culls far too many isolated and sporadic instances, ignoring far too much
that looks the other way. It is easy enough to say that these defendants
should pay for all "typical" losses regardless of their fault, and distribute
them by insurance; it is quite another matter to say that society is ready
to impose upon even some such defendants the possibly ruinous expense
of that insurance. One has only to look at the experience in the legislatures with proposals for compulsory automobile insurance to see where
the diffitulty lies and why any general progress in this direction must be
slow. I must confess also that I find considerable difficulty in determining what is to be an "enterprise," and in applying that concept to
the farmer in his Ford; and that when it comes to a fire which spreads
three hundred yards from a railroad track, I have quite as much uncertainty in deciding whether it is "typical" of a railroad enterprise as I do
in dealing with it in any other way.
The sole function of a rule of limitation in these cases is to tell the
court that it must not let the case go to the jury. Yet we are in a realm
where reasonable men do not agree. At least if judges and legal writers
be reasonable men, they have not agreed. Palsgraf itself is the perfect
illustration. When thirteen judges divide, and seven of them are with
the final dissent, when the Advisers of the Institute divide, when the
issue is repeatedly decided by a single vote and writers debate the case
for twenty-five years without unity, there is something a bit cavalier and
unreliable about Cardozo's conclusion that no reasonable man could
find for the plaintiff. Granted that the technical issue was whether the
jury should have the case, it was not debated along those lines, but upon
146 EHRENZWllIG, NEGLIGENCE Wl'I'HoUT FAULT (1951); Ehrenzweig, "Loss-Shifting
and Quasi-Negligence: A New Interpretation of the Palsgraf Case," 8 Umv. Cm. L. REv.
729 (1941). See Malone, ''This Brave New World-A Review of 'Negligence without
Fault'," 25 So. CAL, L. REv. 14 (1951).
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whether the plaintiff should recover. Granted further that somewhere
a line must be drawn at which the case must be taken from the jury,
Palgraf may well serve as an example and a warning to appellate courts
to proceed with caution where facts vary so greatly and to avoid arbitrary
rules which purport to be of universal application.147 We are not yet,
in the middle of this century, so well settled and agreed on the basis
and extent of tort liability that we can safely close and nail up the door.

Conclusion
The reader was warned at the outset that he would be offered no
formula, no rules, and no conclusion. It has been, I think, always the
formula, the generalization which has been at fault, in a £.elq where it
seems impossible to generalize at all. "The mule don't kick according
to no rule." Direct causation, the scope of the risk, the unforeseeable
plaintiff, the last human wrongdoer, the distinction between cause and
condition, limitations of time and. space, substantial factors, natural
and probable consequences, mechanical systems of multiple rules, and
all the rest of the rigmarole of "proximate cause," all have been tried
and found wanting in situations that inevitably arise to which they do
not and cannot provide a satisfactory solution. There is no substitute
for dealing with the particular facts, and considering all the factors that
bear on them, interlocked as they must be. In this respect Leon
Green148 has been for a quarter of a century a voice crying in the wilderness; and as one of the original scoffers at his doctrine, I make him
belated obeisence.
What we are left with is at most an approach to the problem, an
attitude, a beginning-a vague, rough and general statement of what
we are looking for. For this purpose, I doubt that all the manifold
theories of the professors really have improved at all upon the old words
"proximate" and "remote," with the idea they convey of some reasonable
connection between the original negligence and its consequen.ces, between the harm threatened and the harm done. In other words, if there
is a conclusion, it is that the courts may very possibly have been right
all the time after all.1 49
147 "[The Palsgraf Case], by virtue of the sharp difference of opinion of the judges,
should be a warning to appellate courts not lightly to assume the primary duty of determining liability or nouliability, in actions of tort, but to leave that duty where the Constitution
has placed it, with the jury, as triers of facts, and if they act capriciously and arbitrarily
to supervise their action." Jackson v. B. Lowenstein & Bros., 175 Tenn. 535 at 538, 136
S.W. (2d) 495 (1940). See also Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, 262 Wis. 229, 55
N.W. (2d) 29 (1952).
148 GREEN, RAnoNALE oF PROXIMATE CAasE (1927); GREEN, JUDGE AND Jany
(1930).
149 Contra: PnossER, TonTs 313 (1941).

